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ABSTRACT 
The focus of this work is on the issue of managing credibility information in 
reasoning systems. We first discuss a closely related idea, that of multicriteria 
decision making. It is shown how the concept of importance in mulitcriteria 
decision making is similar to the concept of credibifity in evidential reasoning 
systems. A new concept of credibility qualification is introduced in both the theory 
of approximate r asoning and the mathematical theory of evidence. A concept of 
relative credibility is also introduced. This relative credibility is useful in situations 
where the credibility of a piece of evidence isdetermined by its compatibility with 
higher priority evidence. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the construction of automated systems that aggregate and reason with 
pieces of evidence, an important consideration is the amount of credibility 
associated with these items of evidence. One can essentially qualify a piece of 
evidence by its credibility. Credibility qualification is distinct from other forms 
of qualification such as probabilistic and possibilistic qualifications (see Prade 
[1] for a comprehensive discussion of these kinds of qualifications). One 
manifestation f this distinction is that zero credibility reflects itself into a total 
lack of knowledge rather than the negation or dual of the original knowledge as 
is the case of probability. Thus, if an agent says that it is raining and I assign 
no credibility to this agent's information, rather than concluding that it is not 
raining, I conclude nothing about he weather. In this regard, the operation of 
credibility qualification acts like an importance operator in mulitcriteria deci- 
sion making. Closely related to these ideas, in the Dempster-Shafer theory of 
evidence, is the notion of reflecting lack of knowledge by assigning mass to the 
entire universe. 
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Another interesting characteristic of credibility qualification is that in some 
cases the credibility assigned to a piece of evidence can be a function of its 
compatibility with other, higher priority evidence. 
We begin with a discussion of multicriteria decision functions because the 
relationship of importance to criteria provides a link to the relationship of 
evidence to credibility. We then look at the issue of credibility qualification in 
the framework of Zadeh's theory of approximate r asoning. We consider the 
situation where credibility is context-dependent. In this situation, we draw 
upon my work on nonmonotonic reasoning (Yager [2, 3]). We then look at the 
issue of credibility qualification in the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence 
(Dempster [4], Shafer [5]). 
2. IMPORTANCE IN MULTICRITERIA DECISION MAKING 
A central aspect of the problem of multicriteria decision making is con- 
cerned with the issue of aggregation. In this section, we use the framework 
introduced by Bellman and Zadeh [6] to investigate a number of issues in this 
domain. 
Assume that X is a set of possible solutions to a problem. We call these our 
decision alternatives. Let A l," " ", A q be a collection of fuzzy sets that each 
represent a criterion or goal we desire to satisfy. In this environment, 
Ai(x) E[0, 1] indicates the degree to which alternative x satisfies criterion 
Ai. The overall decision function D is 
D(x) = F( A,(x)  . . . . .  Aq(X)). 
Thus D(x) essentially aggregates the individual satisfactions of x to each of 
the criteria. In this situation, the preferred alternative is the one that maximizes 
D( x). 
The form of F depends upon the relationship of the criteria. The form 
initially introduced by Bellman and Zadeh was 
D(x)  = A , (x )  ^ . . .  
where A = rain. This formulation indicates a relationship in which we desire to 
satisfy all the criteria; it is an ANDing of the criteria. 
A crucial aspect of this Am)ing relationship is that for a given x, any 
criterion that is not satisfied, one that has a low rating for x, can severely 
reduce the overall value of D(x) .  On the other hand, a satisfaction of one does 
not effect the function D; this is so because a A 1 = a. We also note that this 
formulation exhibits a property called idempotency, that is, a ^  a = a. Be- 
cause of this idempotency, a criterion can be included more than once and it 
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will not have any additional effect. This means that in some complex problems 
where we inadvertently, under perhaps different names or closely related 
concepts, include the same conditions, we do not pay a price for doing so. 
We should note that although we will be mainly concerned with the min 
operator, there exists a whole family of other ways of implementing the 
ANDing aggregation. The family of these operators are called t-norm opera- 
tors (Dubois, [7]). Among this class one member that we will find very useful, 
especially for exhibiting some properties, is the product. Using the product 
operator, we obtain an alternative implementation for this aggregation as 
D(x)  = AI(X) * A2(x)  *""  * Aq(x) .  
Using this formulation it becomes easy to see the strong effect of the small 
satisfactions. Consider 
where aj e [0, 1]. In this case, 
OD 
Oak 
From this we easily see that 
D= 1-Ia 1 
J 
= I-I aj 
over j :~ k 
aD 
Max - -  
k aak 
occurs for a* = Min/aj. Thus the greatest rate of change of D occurs for the 
smallest argument. 
We also note that the use of the product is not idempotent; thus multiple use 
of the same criteria has an effect. 
In [8-10], I extended this basic model by allowing for the association with 
each criterion a i a value o/i ~ [0 ,  1] indicating the degree of importance of that 
criterion. In this situation, the closer ct i is to 1, the more important he 
criterion; c~ i = 0 signifies no importance. In [8], I suggested including the 
importance information in the formulation of a multicriteria ggregation func- 
tion as 
D(x)  = (A , (x ) )= '  ^  (A2(x ) ) "2A""  
O(x)  : M in [ (A j (x ) )~q.  
In [9] it is shown that this kind of formulation satisfies some reasonable 
conditions when we use the product instead of the min; this gives us 
D*(x) = 1-[ [ (A j (x ) ) '~q 
J 
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In [10] I extended this idea of including importance to a more general 
framework. In particular, I suggested that one can include importance via the 
formulation 
n(x)  = M!n[H(0 / j ,  A (x ) ] .  
J 
In [10], I suggested that the form of H be 
H(a ,b)=I (a ,b )  
where ! is any multivalued logic implication operator. Furthermore, we can 
express this formulation in terms of a t-conorm operator (Dubois and Prade 
[11]). In particular, if S is a t-conorm, then 
H(a ,  b )= S(~,  b) 
where ~ is the negation of a, usually 
a=l -a .  
Recall that a t-conorm S [11] is defined as 
S: [0, 1] × [0, 1] ~ [0, 1] 
such that 
1. S( a, b) = S( b, a) (commutativity) 
2. S( a, S( b, c)) = S( S( a, b), c) (associativity) 
3. S(a, b) >_ S(c, d) if a _> c and b ~_ d (monotonieity) 
4. S(a, 0) = a 
Using this formulation, we can observe some relevant characteristics associ- 
ated with the importance operator H.  
1. The greater the importance, the greater the influence. Assume that 
0/1 -> 0/2- Consider H(0/I, a) and H(0/2, a), where H(0/I, a) = S(1 - 
0/1, a) and H(0/2, a) = S(1 - 0/2, a). Since 0/1 -> 0/2, 1 - 0/2 -~ 1 - 0/1; 
hence from the monotonicity of S, 
H( .2 ,  a) -> H(0/ , ,  a) 
As indicated, the smaller the conjunct, the more influence it has in the 
formulation of D. Thus H(0/I ,  a), being smaller, has a more influential 
role. 
2. Zero importance means no influence. Assume that 0/ = 0; then H(0/, a) 
= S(1 - 0, a) = 1. Since b^ 1 = b, when 0/ = 0 the term exerts no 
influence on the formulation of D. 
3. We note that if 0/ = 1, then 
= s(1 - 1, = 
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A large class of operators atisfy the property of being a t-conorm. Among 
some of the most salient of these operators are (Dubois [7], Dubois and Prade 
[l l]) 
S(a, b) = Max(a, b) 
S(a,b) =a+b-ab  
S(a, b) = 1 h (a p + bP) l/p, 
S (a ,b )= 1^(a+ b) 
p -1  
We should note that this general formulation for the inclusion of importance 
in the aggregation function has a number of properties that are inherent in the 
third condition associated with the t-conorm operators. We call these the 
monotonicity properties of the aggregation. 
There exists a monotonicity condition with regard to satisfaction of criteria. 
If, all else remaining the same, the satisfaction of x to one of the criteria 
decreases, then D(x) does not increase. A second monotonicity condition is 
exhibited by the importances. If the importance of one of the criteria increases, 
then D(x)  does not increase. Because an increase in importance or decrease in 
satisfaction can be viewed as an increase in requirements, we see that as the 
requirements increase, the satisfaction decreases. Parenthetically, we note that 
the addition of a criterion can be seen as an increase in importance of that 
criterion from zero to some value or. Hence the addition of criteria leads to a 
decrease in overall satisfaction. 
On the one hand, the addition of an alternative can only cause our overall 
satisfaction, the evaluation of the best solution, to increase. Assume that X is 
our set of alternatives and that x* is our optimal solution. If we now have 
alternatives Z = X U Y, we have added some alternatives; if x + is the best 
alternative from Z, it is always the case that D(x +) >_ D(x*). 
On the other hand, if one assumes that the relationship between the criteria 
specified by the decision maker is to satisfy "at least one" of the criteria, then 
we get an oR-like aggregation. In this case our overall decision function E is 
formulated as 
E(x) = AI(X ) VA2(x  ) v - "  Vmq(x)  
where v = max. 
In [10], I suggested a methodology for including an importance-like 
operator in this environment. In particular, I suggested 
E(X) = M.ax[T(ot j ,  aj(x))] 
J 
In the above, T is any t-norm operator, that is, 
T: [0, 11 × [0, 11 ~ [0, 11 
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Note that this operator has the same properties as the S operator except that 
property 4 of [101 is replaced by 
(4') r(a,  1) = a 
Examples of this t-norm operator are 
(1) Max(a ,b )  and (2) a*b 
In [12] I suggested an approach to aggregations lying between the AND 
and OR. 
3. PRIORITIES AND IMPORTANCES 
A concept that is closely related to that of relative importance between 
criteria is that of priority of one criterion over another. Intuitively speaking, 
we shall say that one criterion has priority over a second criterion if the effect 
of the second depends upon the approval of the first. In this section, we 
investigate the relationship between these two ideas. In particular, I show that 
the effect of priorities can be seen as a special case of importances. 
Initially, we assume that we have criteria A t and A 2 with importances c~ 1 
and ot 2. For any x in our alternative set X,  we let 
D(x) : (A , (x) )~'^ (A2(x)) ~2 
For simplicity of explanation, we assume that the importance of A 1 is 1, 
oq = 1. Hence we get 
D(x )  = A , (x )  ^ (Az (x ) )~2 
In this situation, rather than associating with A 2 some predetermined 
ot 2 ~ [0, 1], we say that the importance of A 2 depends upon its compatibility 
with (acceptance by/approval of) A I. In this case we are essentially saying 
that A 1 has a higher priority than A 2. 
In particular, we let 
ot 2 = Poss[ A 2 I A,] 
where 
Poss[ A21A,] = Max[  A,(x)AA2(x)]  
x 
This function measures the degree to which A 2 agrees with at least one of 
A~'s preferred solutions. Using this function to measure the compatibility, we 
get 
D(x) = A,(x)  ^  (A2(x ) )  P°sstA~l A,I 
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These kinds of decision functions are studied in considerable detail in Yager 
[13]. A first observation we can make about his new form of decision function 
is that it is not pointwise; the evaluation of D(x) involves, through 
Poss[A2 [ A1], the values of Al(y) and A2(Y) at all yeX.  In this environ- 
ment, we also note that the importance associated with alternative A 2 is 
context-dependent. A reason for this context dependence is that Poss[ A 2 ] A~] 
depends upon the set of alternatives X. As X changes, the value of 
Poss[A2 1 AI]  is subject o possible change. One restriction on this change is 
that as X increases we get more alternatives; Poss[ A21 Ad cannot decrease. 
It should also be noted that a kind of nonmonotonicity exists in regard to the 
importances. For example, if we increase the severity of A I by making A t(x) 
smaller for some of the x's ,  this in turn can make Poss[A2] Ai]  smaller. 
However, the diminution of Poss[A21 Ad  will cause an increase in 
(A2(x)) P°~tA21A'I. This increase may result in an increase in D(x). Thus we 
can see that with this formulation an increase in requirements can cause an 
increase in apparent satisfaction. In effect, what has happened is that the 
increase in stringency with respect to A 1 has caused us to discount the 
influence of A 2. 
4. CREDIBIL ITY AND DISCOUNTING IN 
APPROXIMATE REASONING 
In this section we investigate the issue of credibility and discounting in the 
theory of approximate reasoning. A detailed discussion of the theory of 
approximate r asoning (AR) can be found in Zadeh [14]. Here I just introduce 
the basic ideas that are essential for our discussion of credibility (or belief). 
Assume that V is a variable taking its value in the set X. A proposition 
(piece of knowledge) in AR is a statement of the form 
V is  A 
where A is a fuzzy subset of X. The semantics of the above statement is to 
express the knowledge that the value of V lies in the set A. More formally, as 
described by Zadeh [15], such a statement induces a possibility distribution on 
X such that for each x~X,  A(x) indicates the possibility that V assumes the 
value x. 
In AR if we have a collection of propositions P~, P2 . . . .  , P~ each of the 
form V is A j, we indicate that a proposition P is inferable from our 
knowledge base as 
(P , ,  P2 . . . . .  P.)  I-- P 
Specifically, we can infer any proposition of the form V is B, where B is any 
set such that 
A* C B and A* = A 1 CI A 2 f' l A 3 f"l • " " ~ A n 
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Thus any set containing the intersection of our knowledge base is inferable. 
It is our purpose here to be able to associate with any given proposition 
P: V i sA  
a measure ot indicating the credibility or belief we attribute to this proposition. 
We let the unit interval [0, 1] be the default scale used to measure credibility; 
hence tx e [0, 1]. 
In using this scale we intend the case c~ = 1 to mean that the information is 
assumed to be completely credible (or believable) and the case tx = 0 to mean 
that we attribute no credibility to this piece of information. 
We shall use a notion such as 
V is A is ot credible 
or, equivalently, 
P :  Cred a 
to convey this information. 
Inherent in our definition of this type of credibility qualification is the fact 
that when ot = 1 we take the piece of information exactly on its face value. 
This property, among other things, affords us the luxury of assuming, by 
default, that propositions with no mention of credibility have credibility value 
1. Thus, 
V is A is 1 credible *~ V is A 
At the other extreme, when ot = 0, we want to completely discount the 
information; that is, 
V is A is 0 credible o V is X 
It should be noted that zero credibility does not result in the negation of A but 
in the whole space. In this situation the original statement has been totally 
discounted. 
The general approach we follow, keeping within the spirit of the theory of 
approximate reasoning, is to translate credibility-qualified statements into 
equivalent nonqualified statements, In particular, we take a statement 
V is A is tx credible 
and translate it into a proposition 
V is  B 
where B is also a subset of  X in which 
s(x) = A(x)) 
Credibility of Evidence 53 
We call D the discounting function. We note that some of the properties that 
we want D to have are the following: 
1. Zero credibility results in the whole space. This condition requires that 
for any a, 
D(0,  a) = 1 
2. The smaller the credibility, the more the discounting. This requires that 
for any cz~ > ot 2, 
O(o~ 2 , a) ~__ O(O~l, a) 
3. A credibility of 1 results in the original statement. This requires that for 
any a 
D(1,  a) = a 
4. Monotonicity exists in regard to the membership. Thus for a > b, 
a) > o) 
This last condition implies that the discounting does not distort he relationship 
between the elements in the set; thus if A(x)  > A(y),  then the discounting 
will not make B(y) > B(x). Subsequently I indicate some cases where we 
want to violate this condition. 
Another property that we desire is that whatever the credibility or, 
V is X is ot credible o V is X 
This requirement implies that we must satisfy the condition that for all ct, 
D(ot, 1 )= 1 
However, there is no need to explicitly require this condition because it is 
implicit in the other conditions. This follows for the monotonicity with respect 
to ot and the two conditions D(1, 1) = 1 and D(O, 1) = 1. 
In a broad sense we can associate the credibility value assigned to a 
proposition with the credibility of the agent providing the information. Thus, 
the more reliable the agent, the more credibility (or importance) we give to the 
data. In this light, it appears that a natural function for discounting knowledge 
is to use one of the importance formulations discussed in the previous ection. 
In particular, if S is any t-conorm operator, then 
B(x)  = D(c~, A(x ) )  = S(~,  A(x ) )  
We note that the use of this formulation satisfies our required conditions: 
1. D(O, A(x))  = S(1, A(x))  = 1 
2. When tx ! > tx 2, then D(cz 2, A(x))  = S(~ 2, A(x))  >_ S(ff t, A(x))  >_ 
D(a~, A(x)) 
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3. D(1, A(x)) = S(O, A(x)) = A(x) 
4. If a > b, then D(ot, a) = S(ff, a) _ S(ff, b) = D(cz, b) 
Since the maximum operator is the least of the t-conorm operators, it is the 
case that, for any D, 
D(~,  a) -> ~v a 
Other notable xamples of discounting operators are 
1. D(ot, a) = 1A(1-ot+a)  
2. D( ct, a) = a ~ 
3. D( . ,  a) = (1 -  a) + as  
It should be noted that if we have 
being translated into 
where 
V is A is ot credible 
Vis  B 
s(x)-- A(x)) 
then it is always the case that 
B(x)>_A(x)  
that is, A CB.  
The following theorem relates the inference process to the discounting 
process. 
THEOREM 1 Reducing the credibility of  any of the propositions in a 
knowledge base decreases the collection of  valid inferences. 
Proof Assume that Pj, V is A j, are a collection of propositions with 
credibility otj associated with each proposition and By is the transformed value 
associated with Pj. If we denote B* = NyBj, then any proposition V is B 
such that B* C B is inferable. Assume that any one of the propositions, Pk, 
has its credibility reduced; then the equivalent proposition in this environment 
is B j=B~ for j :#k ,  B kCB~c. If we let B += NjB.'., then B*CB+;  
therefore, it is possible for there to be some B such that B ~ C B and B+~ B. 
Although the reduction of credibility reduces the number of valid inferences, 
in some cases it may reduce the conflict within the knowledge base. 
We have assumed that the credibility associated with a proposition is a 
precise number in the unit interval. In some cases our knowledge about the 
credibility associated with a proposition may not be good enough to allow us to 
so precisely indicate the value of or. In these cases, we may find it useful to use 
a linguistic value to indicate the credibility of a proposition. 
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Consider the proposition V is A is ot credible, where t~ is a linguistic value 
such as "high,"  " low,"  or "about 6."  In this environment, we can represent 
ot as a fuzzy subset of the unit interval. In this case, for each y e [0, 1], a (y )  
indicates the degree to which y satisfies the concept or linguistic value 
conveyed by or. Some examples of notable linguistic values are shown in 
Figure 1. 
In this environment, with t~ linguistic value, the proposition 
V is A is a credible 
again induces an unqualified statement 
V is  B 
where B(x)  = D(ct, A (x) )  = S(ff, A(x) ) .  In this situation i is defined such 
that if(y) = ct(1 - y). In this case ff is the antonym of or. This definition 
preserves the fact that i = 1 - or. 
In this example, since c~ is a fuzzy subset, it turns out that B(x)  becomes a
fuzzy membership grade. That is, B becomes a type H fuzzy subset, one with 
fuzzy membership grade. 
Consider the situation where we use for S the max operator; then 
In this case, 
If  we used 
D(x) - -a  
"high" I 
"close to 5" 
Figure 1. 




then we would get 
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[ ~(y) ) 
B(x)= ~y t (A (x ) )y  ) 
The following example will illustrate the calculation of B from A and c~ in 
the case where ~x is a fuzzy value. 
EXAMPLE Let X = { a, b, c}. Assume we have the proposition 
V is A is ol credible 
Let 
a b c 
and assume that ot has the value " low,"  where low is defined by 
{1 1 .9. ,  .2} 
" low"  = , , , 
0 .1 .2 .3 '  .4 
This proposition then induces a new proposition 
Vis  B 
where B is a second-order fuzzy set. Using the max type discounting function, 
we get 
B(x )  = (~vA(x) )  
In this example, 
.2 .5 .9 1 1 } 
i f=  .6 '  .7 '  .8 '  .9 '  1 
Introducing this value into B(x),  we get 
{.2 .5 .9 1 1} {~6} {.2 .5 .9 1 1} 
B(a)= ~'~ '~ ' .b ' i  v = ~ '~ '~ '_9 ' i  ,11} {1} /1} 
B(b)= .6 '  .7 '  .8 '  .9 '  1 V = ]- { ' /911/  
B(~)= ~,~, .8 , .~ , i  v = 7g ' . ? ' i  
5. RELAT IVE  CREDIBIL ITY  
In this section we are again interested in the problem of aggregating various 
pieces of evidence. In the previous ection we associated with each proposition 
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a value ot~[0, 1] indicating the credibility we assigned to that piece of 
knowledge. The cz value played a central role in determining how much we 
discounted the information. Usually this value can be seen to be a measure of 
the credibility of the agent supplying the information. In this section, we 
consider the situation where we have a piece of evidence whose credibility is 
determined by the compatibility of that piece of evidence with a collection of 
other pieces of evidence. 
Assume we have a knowledge base consisting of PI, P2 . . . . .  Pn, P,+l.  
Let 
P~+l: V is E 
be a piece of evidence whose credibility ot is denoted 
= c(P , ,  P2 . . . . .  P.) 
In this framework the Pt . . . . .  Pn are called the preeminent knowledge 
associated with this piece of evidence. This formulation is meant o indicate 
that the discounting associated with the proposition V is E, its ot value, is 
determined by the compatibility of the proposition V is E with the preeminent 
knowledge. 
In order to obtain the compatibility of our proposition with its preeminent 
knowledge, we use the measure of possibility of the knowledge given the 
preeminent knowledge. 
Cp.+,( P, , P2 . . . . .  P.) = Poss[P .+, /P1 fq P2 f~ "'" f~ P.] 
Assuming that each P/ is of the form 
V is Aj 
then 
Cp.+,(e,.P2 . . . . .  Pn) = Max[ At (x)  AA2(x)  A""  AAn(x)  AE(x)]  
X 




ot = Poss[ V is E~ V is A] = Max[A(x)  ^E(x) ]  
Thus we see that the larger the degree of intersection between the face 
knowledge of Pn+l and its preeminent knowledge, the less we discount, the 
larger the ot value associated with the knowledge Pn +l- It should be carefully 
noted that the process of calculating ol involves the whole of the knowledge 
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base Pl, P2 . . . . .  Pn, Pn+l" This process is very much in the spirit of 
nonmonotonic logics (Ginsberg [16]) in the sense that default knowledge is 
discounted if it contradicts categorical knowledge. Under this imperative we 
discount the fact that a typical bird flies when we learn the preeminent 
knowledge that its wings have been clipped. 
Having obtained this ot value, the piece of knowledge, V is E, gets 
discounted and translated into 
V is  F 
where, as before, 
F(x )=S(~,E(x ) )  
However, in this case, since 
ot = Poss[ E /A  ] 
then 
F(x) = S(1 - Poss[E/A],E(x)) 
Once having obtained F, we can calculate our overall knowledge base as 
FNjAj and then use this to draw our conclusions. 
If  we use the max operator for S, we get 
F(x) = E(x) V (1 - Poss [E /A] )  
If  we use the exponential model, then 
F(X)  = E(x )  P°~te/Al 
We note that if Poss[E/A] = 1, then no discounting takes place. On the other 
hand, if Poss[E/A] = 0, complete discounting has occurred. 
In a more general sense, we can express the relationship between ot and 
Poss[E/A] in a functional manner, that is, 
, ,  - -  g(Poss[ e/A]) 
where g is a monotonically increasing function. If  g(1) < 1, then the evidence 
is discounted even if it is completely compatible with the preeminent knowl- 
edge. 
We first note that if, for all x, 
g( x) = a 
then we are essentially in the situation of the previous ection, one in which a 
is the absolute measure of credibility and is not affected by the preeminent 
knowledge. In the special case where a = 1, the information is not discounted 
at all. 
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6. ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF CREDIBILITY 
In the previous sections, when faced with a proposition whose credibility 
was less than complete, we discounted the information provided by the 
proposition essentially by making less specific the information provided. Thus, 
given 
we derived the information 
where 
V is A is a credible 
Vis A + 
A+(x) > A(x) for all x 
Fundamentally, we ended up with another, although less informative, proposi- 
tion of the same type. One way of viewing the effect of this operation is in 
terms of possibility and certainty measures (Zadeh [17]). In particular, we 
recall that for any subset F 
Poss[ V is F/V is E] = Max IF (x )AE(x ) ]  
x 
Cert[ V is F/V is E] = 1 - Poss[F/E]  
Since AX(x) >_ A(x), then for all subsets B, 
Poss [V isB /V is  A +] _> Poss[ V is B/  V is A] 
Cert[Vis B /V is  A +] _<Cert[Vis B /V is  A] 
Therefore we essentially increased what is possible and decreased what is 
certain. Thus the reduction of credibility results in a reduction of what is 
certain. 
There appears to be an alternative way of discounting a piece of evidence to 
reflect our lack of complete belief in the information. This approach can 
consist of a probabilistic type of discounting. Assume we have a piece of 
evidence 
Vis A 
that has a credibility ol. An alternative way of discounting is to assign a 
probability c~ that V is A is correct and a probability 1 - o~ to the statement 
Vis X 
611 Ronald R. Yager 
This type of operation generates a Dempster-Shafer belief structure, a simple 
support function (Shafer [5], Smets [18]): 
V i s  A ot 
V is X 1-c~ 
We note that in this case if our credibility is zero, we end up with the complete 
base set 
V i s  X 
whereas if c~ = 1, we end up with the original piece of evidence, V is A. 
We recall that in the Dempster-Shafer f amework, for any subset B of X 
we can define two set measures, plausibility (P1) and belief (BED, such that for 
any set B, 
P I (B)  = otPoss[B/A] + (1 - ct)Poss[B/X] 
BeI[B]  = c tCer t [B /A]  + 1 - c tCer t [B /X]  
where 
Cert (B)  -< Prob(B)  < P l (B)  
In the following, we assume that A is our known proposition, which has 
credibility or, and B is some arbitrary proposition of interest. We assume that 
both A and B are normal, that is, 
MaxA(x)  = 1, MaxB(x)  = 1 
x x 
We first note that if a = 1, then 
P I (B)  = Poss[B/A] and Bel(B)  = Cert[B/A] 
Thus plausibility and possibility are effectively measuring the same concept. 
Similarly, certainty and belief are measuring the same thing. I f  a = 0, then 
P I (B)  = Poss[B/X] = 1 
Cert (B)  = Cer t [B /X]  = MinB(x)  
x 
Let us denote 
PI~(B) = ~ Poss [B /A]  + (1 - ~)Poss [B /X]  
Bel~(B) = ~Cer t [n /n ]  + (1 - ~)Cer t [B /X]  
We note actually that since 
Poss[ B /x ]  = 1 
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then 
PI . (B)  = ~Poss[B /A]  + 1 -  a 
In the special case when ot = 1, we drop the subscript. 
The following relationships hold for all A, B, and (~: 




Poss[ B /A]  __ o~Poss[ B /A]  
Bel[ B] > Bel.[ B] 
Cert[ B / X ] <_ Cert[ B / A ] 
These relationships indicate that the introduction of discounting via this 
probabilistic method also results in an increase in uncertainty. 
The belief structure resulting from this discounting is a consonant belief 
structure (Shafer [5]) because A C X. As shown by Shafer [5], consonant 
belief structures have some unique properties. In particular, for any consonant 
belief structure there exists a contour function F(x)  such that F(x)  = PI({ x}). 
In our case, F(x )  = aA(x)  + 1 - a. The fact that the discounting formula 
F(x )  = o~A(x) + 1 - a corresponds to Shafer discounting was previously 
pointed out by Dubois and Prade [19]. 
The contour function has the characteristic that 
and since 
it follows that 
Ply(B)  = Max[F (x )^B(x) ]  
X 
Bel(B) = 1 - Pl(B) 
and 
BeI.(B) = 1-  Max[F(x) AB(x)] 
X 
In our case this implies that 
PI~(B) = Max[ (aA(x)  + (1 - or)) ^ B (x ) ]  
x 
Bel.(B) = 1 - Max[ (aA(x)  + (1 - a))  ^ B (x ) ]  
x 
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We next recall from the previous ection that our methodology for discount- 
ing a piece of evidence V is A that had a credibility ot was to form a new 
piece of evidence, V is D, such that for each x ~ X,  
D(x)  = S(~, A(x) )  
where S is any arbitrary t-conorm. Let us consider the special t-conorm 
S(a ,b)  = a + b - ab 
Using this operator, 
O(x)  = ff + A(x )  - txA(x) = ¢xA(x) + (1 - or) 
From this we obtain 
POss[B/D] = Max[ (o tA(x )+ (1 -  or)) AB(x) ]  
X 
Cert[B/D] = 1-  Max[ (cxA(x)+ (1 -  cO) AB(x) ]  
x 
From this we easily see that 
Poss[B/D] = PIe(B ) and Cert[B/D] = Bel~(B) 
Thus we see that the use of probabilistic type discounting can be seen as a 
special case of our original form of discounting with the appropriate selection 
of the operator S. 
This raises the more general question of how one would select the appropri- 
ate operator S. There appear to be at least two, perhaps not distinct, considera- 
t.ions we can use. A first approach can be generally classified as quantitative. A 
second approach can be classified as semantic. 
In the quantitative approach we may specify some algebraic or quantita- 
tive characteristic we want to satisfy. For example, we may desire the 
"least discounting for a degree of credibility." In this case, since for any t- 
conorm S, 
S(a, b) >_ Max(a, b) 
the use of the max t-conorm would be the appropriate choice. 
In the semantic approach, we try to first capture the source of our lack of 
complete credibility. For example, if we are dealing with an agent whose past 
record is erratic, we might use a probabilistic format o represent the random- 
ness of his performance. 
There is one other consideration we might desire to include in our formula- 
tion of credibility qualification. Assume that we have a piece of evidence V is 
A obtained from some agent. It is conceivable that the agent's credibility may 
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be a function of the value x of the base set X underlying V. That is, a 
particular source may be very effective in analyzing information in some range 
of X but not as good in other ranges. This observation leads us to consider the 
case in which the credibility assigned a piece of evidence is a function of X, 
that is, ot = h(x). In this situation, 
D( x) = S 0 - h( x), A( x) ) 
There exists another consideration we may wish to include in our transfor- 
mation. Assume that V is some variable that takes its value in the base set X. 
Furthermore, assume that X has some metric on it that enables us to measure 
a degree of proximity between any two points. Let 
p: x × x - .  [o, 1] 
where the larger the value p(x,  y) the closer the two elements. Assume we 
have a piece of evidence 
Vis  A 
where A = { Xo}. That is, the evidence states that V is x o. Assume we have 
some credibility ot assigned to this statement. Then 
D(x)  =S(1 -~,A(x ) )  
Furthermore, in this case we would get 
D(xo)  = 1 and D(x)  = l -o r  for a l l x=x o 
Thus, all the values of x not equal to x o have the same value for D(x). In 
many situations this new D does not capture what we desire to happen. For 
example, what may be a more appropriate formulation would be that D is 
around x o. That is, we would like to "soften the edges" at x o rather than 
make everything the same. (See Figure 2.) 
Thus in this case, we would like the discounting at a point x to be a function 
of the proximity of x to x o. In this situation, we could have a discounting 
factor h such that 
h(x) p(x, Xo)) 
x 0 
Figure 2. 
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The form of f will determine the shape of D resulting from the discounting. 
More generally, if A is a fuzzy subset we would use the proximity of x to 
the subset, that is, p(x ,  A). 
One requirement on f is that if ot =0,  f(ot, b )=0 for all b, and if 
ot = 1, then f(ot, b) = 1 for all b. It would also appear that continuity would 
be a desirable requirement. Furthermore, monotonicity on f is required in that 
if cq > tx z then 
f (oq ,  b) _>f(ot 2, b) 
and if b ! > 3 2 then 
f (ot ,  b,)  _> f (ot ,  02) 
7. RELATIVE D ISCOUNTING WITH DEMPSTER'S RULE 
In [5] Shafer describes a representation for a piece of evidence that has come 
to be called a belief structure or Dempster-Shafer structure. In this section I
show how the concept of relative credibility discounting can used in this 
environment. This is particularly useful in situations in which one has multiple 
sources of evidence some of which is of such a nature that we feel that its 
conflicting with other, more preeminent, evidence should result in its being 
excluded from consideration. 
Assume that V is a variable taking its value in the set X. A belief structure 
m has associated with it a collection of nonnull sets A i . . . . .  A ,  called focal 
elements and a set of weights m(A  i) associated with each focal element such 
that 
1. m( A i) > 0 
2. ~. im(A i) = 1 
Assume that m t and m 2 are two pieces of evidence of this type. Let 
A 1 . . . . .  A m and B t . . . . .  B n be the associated focal elements. Dempster's 
rule (Dempster [4], Sharer [5], Smets [18]) provides a mechanism for aggre- 
gating these two pieces of evidence. In particular, if we denote this aggregation 
mas  
m = m I _1_ m 2 
then the weights associated with the focal elements of m are obtained as 
follows. For any subset E of X,  
1 
Y]~ mi( Ai)  * mj( Bj) 
m( E) = 1 - k all Ai('IBj=E 
where 
K= ~_, mi (A i ) *mj (B j )  
all Aif"lBj=cb 
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In the above, the value K is some measure of the conflict between the two 
pieces of evidence. Thus K = 0 indicates no conflict, whereas K = 1 indi- 
cates complete conflict. Shafer uses 
Con(m, ,  m2) = - log(1  - k)  
as the weight of conflict between m~ and m 2. 
More generally, if m t . . . . .  mq are a collection of evidences, then the 
aggregation under Dempster's rule 
m = ml  £m2.1_  ' ' '  .l. mq 
is defined such that for each subset E of X ,  
1 
m(E)  = 
where 
~, mt( Ai, ) x m2(Ai2 ) × m3(Ai3 ) × . . .  
1 - K N Ao=E 
re(E) = Z m,(Ai,) × mz(Ai2) × m3(Ai3) x . . .  
Nj A o = 'I' 
There appears to be a very interesting relationship between the conflict 
degree K and the plausibility measure. Assume that m t and m 2 are two belief 
structures with focal elements A t . . . . .  A q and B l . . . . .  B,,  respectively. 
Let Plt(B ) indicate the plausibility of the set B given the evidence m I , 
P I I (B  ) = ~_,Poss[B/Ai]  *ml (A i )  
i 
Hence for any focal element Bj of m2, 
Pl l (By) = E Poss[ By / Ai] * ml( Ai)  
i 
One can use this formulation to obtain Pl l(m2), the plausibility of belief 
structure m E given the evidence m I (Dubois et al. [20]). In particular, we can 
define 
P l , (m2)  = )'~Pll(Bj)*m2(Bj) 
J 
which is the expected plausibility of the focal elements of m 2. From the above 
we see that 
P l , (m2)  = ~_, Y~Poss[ B j /A , ]  * m,( A,)  * m2(Bj) 
j i 
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It can easily be shown, because of the symmetry, that 
Pl,(m2) = P12(mt) 
Furthermore, if we restrict ourselves to the crisp domain, then we recall that 
Poss[B/A]  = 1 if A n B * ,I, 
Poss[B/A] =0 i fA  f3B=O 
Using this observation, we see that 
Hence, 
Therefore, 
Pl,(m2) = 2 i2  j m,(Ai)*mz(Bj) 
AiNBi~b 
Pll(m2) = 1 - ~_,i~f~j ml(Ai)*mz(By ) 
AiNBj=~ 
K = 1 - Pl,(m2) 
This can provide a way to define K in fuzzy environments. 
The major point is that the conflict is the negation of the degree of 
plausibility of the two aggregated belief structures. 
Parenthetically, we can define Bell(m2) (Dubois et al. [20]), the belief of 
m 2 given ml, as 
Bel,(mz) = 
Be l l (m2)= Y~ m,(Ai)*mz(Bj) 
AicBj 
E Cert[Bj/Ai] *ml(Ai)*m2(Bj) 
all ij 
and hence 
In this situation symmetry requires that 
Be l2 (mt)= ~ ml(Ai)*m2(Bj) 
BjCAi 
We recall that the commonality function for an evidence is defined (Shafer [5]) 
as  
Qt(B) = E Cert[ Ai/B] * ml( Ai) 
i 
Ql(m2) = E Cert[ Ai/Bj] *ml(Ai)*m2(Bj) 
q 
Pll(m2) = 1 - K 
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In the crisp environment, 
Qt(m2) = 
Therefore, 
Q,(m2) = Bel2(m,) 
~_, m,(A i )*m2(Bj )  
BjcAi 
and Q2(m,) = Bell(m2) 
It is interesting to consider the plausibility of a belief structure with itself, 
P l , (mi)  = A,n~'A~j,¢m,( Ai) * mr(Aj) 
This can be seen as some measure of the consistency of the belief structure. In 
this environment, if all the focal elements pairwise intersect, hen Plt(m 0 = 1. 
This is the case, for example, for a consonant belief structure. On the other 
hand, if all the focal elements pairwise are disjoint, then P l l (ml )  = O. This is 
the case for a Bayesian belief structure. 
In these aggregation environments, the appearance of a nonzero value for K 
indicates ome degree of conflict between the evidences. The appearance of 
this conflict requires a normalization in the formulation of the aggregation 
evidence, m. This normalization is introduced via the multiplication by 
1/(1 - K).  One effect of this normalization process is to introduce a kind of 
nonmonotonicity (Yager [21]) into the aggregation process. A problem with 
the normalization is that from the aggregated evidence you cannot necessarily 
recover the original evidence that is, m ~ m i for all i. 
In [22], I describe an approach, based on the OWA operators, for aggregat- 
ing this type of evidence that reduces the possibility of conflict. It does this by 
requiring that only some quantity, such as most, of the individual evidences be 
satisfied rather than all as is the case when Dempster's rule is used. 
In this section we look at an alternative approach to reducing the conflict 
among pieces of evidence. This approach is based on a discounting of the 
evidences. 
In [5] Shafer discusses an approach to discounting evidence very much akin 
to my approach. Assume that m is a belief structure with focal elements 
A~ . . . . .  A n and associated weights m(Aj). Let ot ~ [0, 1] be a value indicat- 
ing the credibility associated with this belief structure. We let m* indicate a 
new belief structure in which we discount m according to our measure of its 
credibility. In particular, as suggested by Shafer, m* has focal elements 
A ! . . . . .  A n and X,  if it is not already one of the Aj's. Then for each 
Aj ~ X,  we discount he weights such that 
m*(Aj)  =otm(mj) 
and for X we get 
m*( X)  = 1 - a + c~m( X)  
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That is, we remove weight, proportional to 1 - or, from the focal elements and 
add this amount o the universal set. We denote this new belief structure m* as 
otm.  
It can be easily seen that under this form of discounting, for any B q: X,  
Furthermore, since 
we have 
Bel* (B) = ot Bel(B) 
PI*(B)  = 1 - BeI*(B) 
PI*(B)  = PI (B)  + (1 - o0[1 - P I (B)]  
We also note that ot = 0 results in m* with just X as its focal element, 
whereas o~ = 1 results in m* = m. 
Let us look at the effect of  this type of discounting suggested in regard to 
Dempster's rule. Consider two belief structures m I and m 2 and assume that 
their credibilities are c~ and & Assume that K equals the degree of conflict 
between these two evidences. 
K = Y~ m, (A i )  × m2(Bj) 
AiNBj=O 
First note that a focal element equal to the universal set will not contribute to 
this sum. That is, any A i or Bj that contributes to K is not the universe X.  
Let 
K*= Y~ m*(Ai) × m*(Bj) 
A~nBj=~ 
K*= Y~ otml(Ai)*6m2(Bj)  
Aif')Bj=,~ 
K*  = cz6K 
Thus the degree of conflict is reduced as we discount he evidence. More 
particularly, it is reduced proportionally to the product of  the discounting 
factors. Thus we see that discounting, reducing the credibility of evidence, 
provides a way to reduce the conflict in evidences. 
Although we will consider for the most part only the form of discounting 
belief structures uggested by Shafer, it is possible to consider other forms of 
discounting belief structures. One alternative approach can be based on chang- 
ing the focal elements in a manner analogous to that used in the previous 
section. Let m be a belief structure with focal elements A~ . . . . .  A q. Let 
be credibility associated with m. Then if m + is the discounted belief structure 
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with focal elements F~ . . . . .  ~q derived from the old focal elements, 
F , (x )  = - ,4 i I x ) )  
and m+(F / )= m(Ai ) .  In this case the focal elements can become fuzzy 
subsets and we get a fuzzy version of belief structures (Yager [23], Dubois and 
Prade [24]). 
When we discussed the concept of credibility associated with a piece of 
evidence m, we assigned a value ct as the value. This value was implicitly 
assumed to be associated with the evidence in some absolute sense; its value 
did not depend on other observations. It appears that a natural type of situation 
is one in which the credibility associated with a piece of evidence is a function 
of the evidence's compatibility with other evidence. In particular, for the 
evidence m, we can associate its credibility et with its compatibility with the 
evidences ml , . . . ,  m n. 
ct = C(m I, m 2 . . . . .  ran) 
In this environment, if we let 
m v = m,  ± m 2 ± " "  ± m n 
then 
= c(m 
A natural measure for this compatibility function is Pimp(m); thus, 
ot = Plmv(m )
In this situation, we would then discount he belief function m by this c~. 
Thus our new belief function, the one replacing m, is m +, where 
m+= [P lmv(m)]m 
The effect of this is to reduce the conflict associated with the introduction of 
m. We note that if P lsv(m) = 1, then there is no discounting. On the other 
hand, if P lsv(m) = O, then we get that m += X. 
In this environment, we recall that the conflict between m v and m is 
related to Plmv(m) by 
K(mV,m)  = 1 - Plmv(m )
With the introduction of m + instead of m we get that 
K(mV,m +) = P lmv(m)*[1  - Plm~(m)] 
= Plmv(m ) - [P lmv(m)]  2 
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Since Plmv(m ) -< 1, this results in a reduction of conflict in a manner that is 
related to the original conflict. We can easily show that this form of discount- 
ing keeps the conflicts to be at most 0.25. 
We can extend this approach of relative discounting to a more general 
setting. Assume that we have a collection of evidences. Assume that we can 
assign each piece of evidence to a priority class. In particular, we let mij be 
the jth piece of evidence in the ith priority class. We initially take all the 
evidences in the first priority class and aggregate them using Dempster's rule. 
Thus, we get an evidence m I being the aggregate of these first-priority 
evidences. It is conceivable that we may first calculate the internal consistency 
of this piece of first-order evidence and then discount its components each by 
1 - K, where K is the degree of conflict of all these evidences. Having 
obtained the aggregation of the highest priority evidence, m~, we are now in a 
position to introduce the second-priority evidence. A suggested way of doing 
this is as follows. For each evidence m2j, we calculate its compatibility with 
ml, that is, Plm~(m2j ). We use this value to individually discount each 
second-order piece of evidence to get m+j 
m~j = Plml( m2j ) * m2j 
We next aggregate these second-order pieces of evidence to obtain m~-, 
= ± ± ± 
We next calculate the compatibility of m~- and m I, Plm,(m~-), and use this 
to discount m~', giving us m*, 
m~ = Plm,(m +) * m~- 
We then aggregate ml and m~ to give us m 2, the discounted aggregate of 
the first two classes 
m 2 = m I .L m~ 
We then introduce the next priority and use m 2 as our basis. 
8. CONCLUSION 
I have introduced a type of qualification that I call credibility qualification 
of a piece of evidence. I have used its close relationship to the idea of 
importance to provide a mechanism for formally manipulating these qualifica- 
tions. I indicated how this type of qualification essentially results in a discount- 
ing of the given evidence in a manner inversely related to its credibility. 
Significantly, I indicated how the credibility associated with a piece of evi- 
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dence can be obtained as a function of the compatibility of the given evidence 
with other pieces of more established evidence. This idea of relative credibility 
is very much in the spirit of nonmonotonic and default reasoning. 
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